The defence of kamalpur, a hamlet on the border, by Capt Ahsan Malik and his 140 men would be an epic in any country's history. He had 70 soldiers of 31 baluch and the same number of para-military troops; all fought well against all odds.
Attacks against Pakistani border outposts in the north had begun in July. These were mounted by mukti bahini, mainly former members of east Pakistan's regular forces, but failed to make any impression. Further attacks on kamalpur, a kilometer from the border, came on 22 October and 14 November, the latter being made by 13 guards battalion (of kler's bde) which established blocking positions to the south. Malik was cut off and his CO lt-col Sultan Ahmed, SJ, tried to relieve him and the other two outposts (naqshi and baromari, to the east) without success. On 30 November (all this before 'war' broke out) major Ayub of 31 baluch tried to re-supply Malik's tiny garrison but failed. He tried again on 4 December and was killed.
Kler tried to take kamalpur on the run, using mukti bahini troops, and failed. He then mounted a battalion attack by 1 maratha light infantry on the 40 men and four 120mm mortars of 83 mortar battery (whose soldiers we had last seen guarding the VIP lounge at Dacca airport) and overran them, suffering one casualty. Kler then 'decided to lay siege to Kamalpur and break down its will to resist', according to Sukhwant Singh. 'Getting wary because of casualties, successive failures and demoralization among the attacking troops, he decided to starve out the garrison by a prolonged siege'. A bde is demoralized by a company? Sukhwant Singh knew that there was no Pakistani artillery in this sector, only two troops of mortars, but states that kler was,
.....further handicapped inasmuch as one of his battalions had just been reorganised from a unit raised initially for counter-insurgency with no support elements. In tracking a weak platoon post, another battalion brought out some weaknesses of leadership under fire. The battalion reached its objective with relatively few casualties. As expected, the enemy turned artillery (he meant mortar) fire on the objective. A mortar bomb landed on the trench occupied by four men close to the commanding officer. He saw limbs fly and lost his nerve.
Captain Ahsan Malik did not lose his nerve when much worse was happening in his area
At about 09:30 on 4 December 'after withdrawing his troops from close siege'. Kler 'hammered the post with seven sorties of MiG 21s firing rockets and cannon and this was repeated twice later that day'. General Gurbax Singh himself entered affairs by sending Captain Malik a note by a mukti bahini courier...whatever you decide to do, we have every intention of eliminating Kamalpur post. It is to save you and our sides casualties this message is being sent to you....he sent another note after a further air strike and this was met, as has been the other messages, by increased firing by Malik's men. But it could not go on. Malik received the order by radio to surrender, which he did at 1900 that day.

'He had', as Sukwant Singh goes on to say, 'put up a courageous stand.....and surrendered after holding a brigade of besiegers for 21 days.... Manekshaw sent a personal congratulatory message to Malik commending his defiant stand (a gentlemanly gesture on the part of a fine officer).

Maj.-Gen Gurbux Singh decided to meet Malik but, while being driven towards kamalpur by kler, their jeep went over a mine. Singh was badly wounded in the feet and had to hand over to Maj.-Gen. Gandharav Nagra of 2 mountain division (which was outside the theater of operations); kler was also wounded but carried on.

As a tremendous example of appreciation, Field Marshal Manekshaw, then the Commander in Chief of the Indian army had also personally commended Capt. Malik for his bravery and courage and had recommended a bravery honour for him when he met his Pakisani counterparts after the war. He mentions this in a recent BBC interview.